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RECENT CASE COMMENTS
licensed and registered vehicle. Rhode Island, on identical facts,
has held that the resident owner-agent's right to operate the vehicle
is conferred by the state and is not dependent upon the consent
of the employer.3 Other jurisdictions, construing slightly different
statutes,4 have concurred in result by holding that the statute does
not apply to a nonresident employer where the car is being
operated by its owner who is a resident, or a nonresident.6
The problem has not yet arisen in West Virginia. Legislation
of the type involved is generally regarded as in derogation of the
common law and the rule of strict construction applied.7 Assuming
that West Virginia would so regard it, the further question arises
whether our court would concur with the principal case. Com-
parison of the statutes of West Virginia8 and Georgia reveals a
striking similarity of nature and design, such that a different con-
struction by' our court could not well be reconciled. The statute
obviously aims at relieving local citizens from the inconvenience at-
tendant on the necessity of resorting to other jurisdictions for re-
lief for injuries resulting from the operation of automobiles by
nonresidents. When the operator is a local citizen driving his
own automobile, duly licensed and registered under state laws,
can his being an agent for a nonresident be deemed sufficient to call
into operation a statute designed to benefit an aggrieved citizen,
but not to prejudice the rights of a nonresident? The decisions
so far answer in the negative, thus furnishing West Virginia per.
suasive precedent for adopting that construction. 10
G. S. B.
PLF4EDING - NONJOINDEr OF CONTRACT PLAINTnFFS. - A and
B were the joint promisees of an insurance policy issued by D. A
right of action accrued under the policy and A prosecuted the ac-
tion in his own name after B refused to join with him. Held, that
3 Olesas v. Hurley Mach. Co., 52 R. L 69, 157 Atl. 426 (1931).
4 N. Y. VEHoLE & TRAnrc LAw § 52; Micr. Comtp. LAws (Mason Supp.
1935) § 4790.
zWallace v. Smith, 238 App. Div. 599, 265 N. Y. Supp. 253 (1933).
6 Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N. W. 557 (1933).
7 Flynn v. Kramer, 271 Mich. 500, 261 N. W. 77 (1935).
s W. VrA. Rzv. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 3, § 31 (in substance providing
that operation by a nonresident, or his agent, of a motor vehicle in West Vir-
ginia shall be deemed equivalent to appointment of the state auditor as at-
torney to receive service of process).
9 Supra n. 2.
10 The constitutionality of such statutes was sustained in Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U. S. 90, 47 S. Ct. 632, 71 L. Ed. 1091 (1927).
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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
the demurrer to the declaration for nonjoinder be sustained and
that the trial court transfer the case to the chancery docket Under
the statute' with leave to make the other promisee a party de-
fendant. Vinson v. Home Insurance C0.2
It was the general rule at common law that all joint
promisees, if living, must join in the action, otherwise the non-
joinder would be fatal.3 Early, however, it was recognized, as an
exception, that if one party refused to join in the action, the other
parties could use the recalcitrant party's name to prosecute the suit
upon indemnifying him against costs. 4 The obvious purpose of this
exception was to prevent one joint promisee from capriciously de-
feating the action of all parties.' If the court in the instant case
had invoked this doctrine, the plaintiff would have had an adequate
i emedy at law by using the credit company's name after indemnify-
ing it against costs. This being so, there would be no ground for
equitable jurisdiction, and the party would have to pursue his legal
remedy.
B. D. T.
PRINCIPAL AND SURETY BY IMPLICATION OF LAW. - P seeks re-
covery from D by notice of motion for judgment to recover the
amount of a judgment paid by her upon a negotiable promissory
note on which she was an accommodation indorser. D had wrong-
fully pledged the note as collateral to secure a note given by it to
X. X was a holder in due course and P was forced to pay this
note. P seeks to recover under the provisions of our statute giving
a surety the right to proceed by notice of motion for judgment2
W . VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 11, § 8.
216 S. E. (2d) 924 (W. Va. 1941).
3 Sandusky v. Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 260, 59 S. E. 1082 (1907) ; Baker v. Peter-
son, 300 Ill. 526, 133 N. E. 214 (1921); Spencer v. McGuffin, 190 Ind. 308,
130 N. E. 407 (1921) ; SW'eigart v. Berk, 8 S. & R. 308 (Pa. -1822).
4 Union Naval Stores Co. v. Pugh, 156 Ala. 369, 47 So. 48 (1908); Bolton
v. Cuthbert, 132 Ala. 403, 31 So. 358 (1902); Harris v. Swanson Bros., 62
Ala. 299 (1878); Wright v. MeLemore, 10 Yerg. 234 (Tenn. 1837); see also
1 BATES, PL.ADING, PRACTICE, PARTIES (2d ed. 1908) 65-66; 47 C. J. § 127
(4), p. 62, n. 4; 2'PAGE, CONTRACTS (1909) § 1143; STEPHENS, PLEADING (2d
ed. 1901) § 31, p. 57.
5 1 ENG. RUL. CAs. 156, 16 (1902) ; Note (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 189.
1 V. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 45, art. 1, § 4, provides that any person
liable as bail, surety, guarantor or indorser, or any sheriff liable for not
taking sufficient bail, or heir, or personal representative of any so liable upon
the payment of judgment rendered on account of such liability may proceed
by motion against any person against whom a right of action exists for the
amount paid.
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